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MLS' DESIGNATED PLAYER RULE: HAS
DAVID BECKHAM SINGLE-HANDEDLY
DESTROYED MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER'S
SINGLE-ENTITY ANTITRUST DEFENSE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Major League Soccer's (MLS) recently implemented Designated Player
Rule and the subsequent signing of worldwide superstar David Beckham to the
Los Angeles Galaxy have signaled the league's attempt to build its prestige
and establish itself as a true "major league." While such developments have
certainly brought heightened publicity to the American brand of soccer, they
may have much more far-reaching effects in the eyes of the law.
One major legal concern with which professional sports leagues
continuously struggle is antitrust. Antitrust law is a crucial check on the
power of professional sports leagues and teams in terms of internal
governance, outside competition, and labor disputes. Because single entities
enjoy exemption from § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,' which prohibits
concerted actions that unreasonably restrain trade, professional sports leagues
have continually attempted to characterize themselves as such, largely to no
avail.2 This comment will examine the reasons MLS was initially successful
in its single-entity defense in Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 3 and
what implications the Designated Player Rule may have on the league's
antitrust characterization and legal status in the future.
This comment will begin by discussing the history and organization of
MLS compared to other major professional sports leagues in the United States.
It will then discuss the origin of the single-entity antitrust defense and how it
has been applied by courts to the other major professional sports leagues.
Further, it will discuss the reasons MLS was victorious in Fraser at the district
court level, why MLS was successful on appeal in the First Circuit, and how
1. See S.F. Seals, Ltd. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (citing
Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 1966)).
2. See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1981); L.A.
Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); McNeil v. Nat'l
Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
3. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser 1), 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
these two decisions affect MLS's status for antitrust analysis. Finally, this
comment will introduce the Designated Player Rule, examine whether it could
change MLS's single-entity status, and discuss whether such a change could
be important as the league continues to grow and develop.
II. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER
Major League Soccer was organized in 1995 as part of the consideration
for the United States' bid to host the 1994 Federation Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA) World Cup.4 Organizers of the event promised to
re-establish premier professional soccer in America, which had been without a
major soccer league since the North American Soccer League (NASL)
collapsed in 1985. 5 Seeking to eliminate problems such as franchise control
and rapidly escalating player salaries, which were largely to blame for the
demise of the NASL, MLS was organized as a single limited-liability
company with several operator-investors in lieu of the traditional model of
American professional sport leagues that consist of an unincorporated
association of individual clubs.6
Originally, players contracted directly with MLS rather than with the
individual teams. 7 The league allocated the marquee players among the teams,
while the rest of the players were acquired either by drafts or trades. 8 MLS's
management committee, comprised of representatives of its investors,
exercised centralized control over league and team operations, including
instituting a maximum salary amount for its teams. 9 Profits and losses were
distributed by MLS to its operator-investors akin to distributions paid by
corporations. 10 Aside from costs such as one-half of the stadium rent, certain
local promotions, and general team administration (including coach and
management staff salaries), which were paid by the team operators, all other
costs were paid by MLS (including player salaries). 1'
Major League Soccer began play in April 1996 with ten teams operated by
six investors, culminating its inaugural season in October with the D.C. United
4. Id. at 132.
5. Id.; see also NASL Homepage, League History, http://home.att.net/-nasl/nasl.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2007).
* 6. Fraser 1, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
7. Id. at 132-33.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 133.
11. Id.
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winning the MLS Cup, the league's first-ever championship.12
III. ANTITRUST, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES, AND THE SINGLE-ENTITY
DEFENSE
The Sherman Antitrust Act, 13 enacted by Congress in 1890, is designed to
promote consumer welfare by preserving a competitive marketplace. 14
Section 1 of the Act prohibits any (1) concerted action, that (2) unreasonably
restrains, (3) interstate trade or commerce. 15  Section 2 prohibits
monopolization and attempted monopolization in interstate commerce. 16
Although the Act is concerned with how concerted action affects consumers,
when courts attempt to apply the Act to professional sports, they often find it
difficult to apply it fairly and consistently. 17  They also have trouble
determining whether a particular league or team rule or act actually helps or
hurts consumers. 18 In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the essence
of sports is producing competition, that sports is "an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all,"' 19 and that "the integrity of the 'product' cannot be preserved
except by mutual agreement. 20  These recognitions have caused courts to
forego traditional per se antitrust analysis in favor of the rule of reason.21
Because professional sports league rules are almost always a result of
concerted action in interstate trade or commerce, rule of reason analysis comes
into play under the "unreasonable restraint" portion of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.22 Instead of per se analysis in which a naked restraint such as a
reduction in output or increase in price is presumed to be illegal as a matter of
law, rule of reason analysis causes courts to balance the challenged restraint on
12. Major League Soccer, About MLS, MLSNET.COM, http://www.mlsnet.com/about/ (last visited
Mar. 21, 2007). The onginal MLS franchise cities included Boston, Columbus, Dallas, Denver,
Kansas City, Los Angeles, New York/New Jersey, San Jose, Tampa, and Washington, D.C. Two
investors operated two teams, while MLS operated the Dallas and Tampa teams. Id.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
14. Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9-11
(1983).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
16. Id. § 2.
17. See, e.g., Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
18. Id.
19. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
20. Id. at 102.
21. Id. at 101-03.
22. Id.
20081
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trade against its pro-competitive virtues on a case-by-case basis. 23 Rule of
reason employs shifting burdens of proof in which a plaintiff must first plead
and prove actual and obvious anticompetitive effects by showing an increase
in price or a reduction in output (known as "quick look" analysis).24 If the
plaintiff cannot succeed under quick look analysis, it can also meet its initial
burden by proving that the defendant has market power in a relevant product
and geographic market (known as "full blown" analysis).25 If the plaintiff
succeeds in showing anticompetitive effects, the defendant then must show
legitimate pro-competitive economic justifications for the anticompetitive
restraint.26 If the defendant is successful, the burden shifts for a final time
back to the plaintiff to show less-restrictive alternatives to the defendant's
restraint. 27
Section 2 analysis employs a substantially similar market power test to
determine whether an entity has attained monopoly power, in that it examines
whether a defendant has monopoly power both in a relevant product and
geographic market. 28 However, showing § 2 monopoly power, in which
courts generally require entities to maintain a market share of about seventy
percent, is more difficult than showing § 1 market power, in which the
required market share is merely thirty percent. 29
A. The Single-Entity Defense
Antitrust law has been a major concern for professional sports leagues
because it affects how leagues can make and enforce their own rules. 30 Any
league rule or collective decision resulting from a vote of its member clubs is a
concerted act and certainly affects interstate commerce, as the business of
23. Id.
24. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (10th Cir. 1998).
25. Id. at 1019.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See generally Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa.
1982); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
29. Courts have defined monopoly power as "the power to control market prices or exclude
competition." United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). Although courts
have hesitated to definitively establish a threshold market share for monopoly power, the Second
Circuit has shed some light on monopoly power analysis: "[s]ometimes, but not inevitably, it will be
useful to suggest that a market share below 50% is rarely evidence of monopoly power, a share
between 50% and 70% can occasionally show monopoly power, and a share above 70% is usually
strong evidence of monopoly power." Broadway Delivery v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122, 129
(2d Cir. 1981).
30. See generally Mid-South Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. 558; Hecht, 570 F.2d 982.
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professional sports is nationwide. 31  Therefore, if the rule or decision
unreasonably restrains trade, it could violate the Sherman Act. 32 Thus, the
leagues have continually sought exemption from the Act. 33  One such
exemption that has been particularly attractive (although largely elusive) to
professional sports leagues is the single-entity defense. 34 The single-entity
defense attempts to circumvent the concerted action element of § 1 of the
Sherman Act, because if a sports league is deemed to be a single entity, its
members would be incapable of conspiring amongst themselves. 35
B. Pre-Copperweld Single-Entity Sports Cases
The first sports case to address the single-entity defense was San
Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League,36 where the court upheld the
defense in the context of the National Hockey League's (NHL) refusal to
allow the Seals club to move to Vancouver. 37 The United States District Court
for the Central District of California said that the league's refusal was not a
conspiracy to restrain trade because its teams were not economic competitors
in the production of professional hockey in North America. 38
Following Seals, the tide turned for the single-entity defense in North
American Soccer League v. National Football League (NASL), 39 when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the National
Football League's (NFL) single-entity defense on grounds that the teams were
distinct, separately owned legal entities that did not share profits or losses. 40
Characterizing the league as a joint venture, the court applied the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine and held that such an organization was not
exempt from § 1 of the Sherman Act.41 The intra-enterprise conspiracy
31. See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. 558; Hecht, 570 F.2d 982.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
33. Aside from the aberration of Major League Baseball, which has been granted a unique
exemption from antitrust law by the courts, other major professional sports leagues have not been as
fortunate in evading antitrust law. See generally Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Fed.
Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
34. See, e.g., L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1981); McNeil v.
Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
35. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-71 (1984).
36. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
37. Id. at 967.
38. Id. at 969-70.
39. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1981).
40. Id. at 1257-58.
41. Clifford Mendelsohn, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: A New Window of Opportunity for the
2008] 417
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doctrine states that "sectionl liability is not foreclosed merely because a parent
and its subsidiary [have] common ownership." 42 Thus, if the doctrine applied
to a parent and its subsidiary, the court reasoned, it surely applied to
professional sports leagues where each team was an independently owned
entity.43
The NFL failed again in its attempt at the single-entity defense three years
later in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League (Raiders 1),44 when the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found the NFL's franchise relocation rule violated § 1.45 Like the
Second Circuit in NASL, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the NFL's distinct
independent team ownership in rejecting the defense, also expressing concern
that if the league were to be exempted for franchise relocation purposes, it
could presumably evade § I liability in all other areas as well. 46 In applying
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the court found illegal concerted
action because "NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent
corporation, but by the separate teams acting jointly. 47
After NASL and Raiders I and in light of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine, professional sports leagues could not be very optimistic about any
attempt at the single-entity defense. However, the Supreme Court's decision
in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.48 provided a possible
"window of opportunity" for a resurrection of the single-entity defense.49
C. Copperweld
In Copperweld, the Supreme Court repudiated the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine, holding that concerted actions between a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary were not subject to § 1 of the Sherman Act because
such entities must be treated as a single actor.50 The Court held that when
legally separate entities have a "complete unity of interest," § 1 does not
apply. 51 "They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle
Single-Entity Defense in Professional Sports, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 69, 76 (2003).
42. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759 (1984).
43. Mendelsohn, supra note 41, at 76.
44. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 1386.
46. Id. at 1388-89.
47. Id. at 1389.
48. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
49. Mendelsohn, supra note 41, at 78.
50. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
51. Id.
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under the control of a single driver." 52 Copperweld recognized that it may be
necessary for a single business enterprise to coordinate its efforts in order to
effectively compete in a competitive marketplace, and therefore, a single
entity's internal agreement "does not raise the antitrust dangers that [section] 1
was designed to police." 53 The Court's reasoning for discarding the intra-
enterprise doctrine centered on the fact that antitrust law is aimed at the
substance of the entities' relationship, rather than the form.54
Although Copperweld only discussed parents and their wholly owned
subsidiaries, the Court's reasoning hinted that other organizational structures
might be exempt from § I scrutiny, as long as the entities involved had unified
interests. 55 Armed with Copperweld and with the intra-enterprise doctrine out
of the picture, professional sports leagues gained a new incentive to assert the
single-entity defense, arguing that their clubs represent a "complete unity of
interests."
D. Post-Copperweld Single-Entity Cases
Even though Copperweld dismissed the intra-enterprise doctrine,
subsequent league attempts at the single-entity defense proved no more
successful than those in the pre-Copperweld cases. In the 1990s, the courts in
both McNeil v. National Football League56 and Sullivan v. National Football
League57 denied the NFL's single-entity defense, finding fatal the clubs'
independent ownership and their competition off the field for things such as
players, coaches, management, ticket sales, merchandise, and other
revenues. 58 The court in Sullivan found that "the critical inquiry is whether
the alleged antitrust conspirators have a 'unity of interests' or whether, instead,
'any of the defendants has pursued interests diverse from those of the
cooperative itself.' ' 59 Sullivan simply reaffirmed McNeil, swatting down the
NFL's second "Hail Mary" in holding that its clubs clearly had diverse
interests from that of the NFL as a whole, and therefore were precluded from
asserting the single-entity defense. 60
52. Id.
53. Id. at 769.
54. Id. at 772.
55. Id.
56. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
57. 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
58. Mendelsohn, supra note 41, at 80-82.
59. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Assoc. Elec. Co-op., Inc.,
838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988)).
60. Id.
2008]
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Two years after Sullivan, the National Basketball Association (NBA) gave
its best shot at the single-entity defense in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v.
National Basketball Ass 'n,61 arguing that although it was an organization of
separately owned clubs, it was a single-entity in the broadcast market because
it created a single product-NBA basketball-which competed with other
basketball leagues as well as other sports leagues and entertainment options.
62
This argument in favor of inter-brand competition was particularly appealing
to the court, which stated that "[w]e see no reason why a sports league cannot
be treated as a single firm in this typology. It produces a single product [and]
cooperation is essential .. ". .-63 Thus, the Seventh Circuit broke from the
previous post-Copperweld decisions in that it held the NBA could be a single
entity in one facet but a joint venture in other facets.64 This functionalist
approach squares with Copperweld's assertion that the substance of the
relationship, rather than form, should be the key, and possibly opened the door
for other leagues to argue the same. 65
E. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C.
Major League Soccer had already been organized and begun play by the
time Chicago Professional Sports was decided, so the case likely did not
influence the league's decision to organize itself as a limited-liability
company. As previously discussed, MLS was initially organized as a limited-
liability company, with operator-investors sharing in both the profits and
losses of the company, akin to that of investors in a corporation. 66 Although
one of the main reasons MLS founders organized their league as a limited-
liability company was to circumvent antitrust problems, its first antitrust battle
began within a year of its inaugural season.67 In February 1997, eight players
sued MLS and its operator-investors; the injunctive class was certified in
January of the following year.68 The players brought suit in the United States
61. 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
62. Id. at 599-600.
63. Id. at 598.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Fraser v. Major League Soccer L.L.C. (Fraser 1), 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132 (D. Mass. 2000).
67. Fraser v. Major League Soccer L.L.C. (Fraser II), 284 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2002).
68. Id. Another exemption from antitrust scrutiny is found in the statutory and non-statutory
labor exemptions, which preclude unions from bringing antitrust challenges while they are engaged in
collective bargaining with employers. The idea is that if unions or employers have labor law
remedies, antitrust challenge is inappropriate. However, these exemptions do not apply if employees
have not unionized, which was the case of the MLS players when Fraser was brought. Because MLS
players were not unionized until 2003, they were not precluded from antitrust challenge. MATrHEW
[Vol. 18:2420
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District Court for the District of Massachusetts under various antitrust
theories, including (1) that the MLS violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by
conspiring not to compete for player services, and (2) that the MLS violated
§ 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the
market for premiere, division one soccer players in the United States by
preventing any other entity from competing with MLS as an American
division one soccer league. 69
Major League Soccer moved for summary judgment on both the § I and
§ 2 claims, asserting the single-entity defense for the § I claim and alleging
the players' failure to establish a relevant market for the § 2 claim. 70
i. District Court Fraser Analysis
The district court began its analysis with the players' § 1 claim and MLS's
single-entity defense. 7 1 Because MLS was organized as a limited-liability
company with its investors owning undivided interests and sharing profits and
losses according to those interests, the court likened it to a corporation and
treated it as such for its single-entity analysis. 72 This formalistic approach in
viewing the league solely in terms of its organizational setup rather than
focusing on the practical effect of its organizational scheme led the court to
conclude that MLS and its investors could not be subject to § 1 of the Sherman
Act because the investors' interests and the league's interests were one and the
same.73 Only if the investors were acting in their own interests and against the
league's could § 1 apply. 74 The court dismissed the players' argument that
MLS investors did in fact compete with each other on and off the field, finding
that even the off-field competition (i.e. coaches' salaries) enhanced on-field
competition, which "is what makes MLS games worth watching. '75 A key
feature of MLS's organization was that its operator-investors did not have the
ability to withdraw from the league and join or form a rival league.7 6 The
court also emphasized the league's centralized business structure, including
J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 516-19
(2005); MLS Players Union, About the MLS Players Union, MLSPLAYERS.ORG,
http://www.mlsplayers.org/about_ mlspu.html (last visited May 5, 2007).
69. Fraser II, 284 F.3d at 54-55.
70. Id. at 55.
71. Fraser 1, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
72. Id. at 134-35.
73. Id. at 135.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 136-37.
76. Id. at 137.
2008]
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MLS's ownership of its teams as well as its direct contracts with its players.77
The court distinguished MLS further by noting that unlike other professional
sports leagues, in creating its business structure MLS operator-investors
surrendered a level of autonomy (such as direct contracting with players) that
owners of teams in plural leagues enjoy.78
The players urged the court to disregard MLS's formal structure,
characterizing it as a "sham designed to allow what is actually an illegal
combination of plural actors to masquerade as the business conduct of a single
entity." 79 In relying on Copperweld, which ignored formal distinctions
between a parent and its subsidiary, the players argued that the "economic
reality" test should be applied to envision distinctions in MLS's limited-
liability structure. 80 The court refused to accept this "reverse Copperweld"
argument, reasoning that "[s]ubjecting a single firm's every action to judicial
scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive
enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to promote." 81 Although the district
court acknowledged that the Copperweld court concentrated on function rather
than form, it still found MLS's corporate-like form to be relevant. 82 It
finished its § 1 analysis by saying rather bluntly:
MLS is what it is. As a single entity, it cannot conspire or
combine with its investors in violation of § 1, and its investors
do not combine or conspire with each other in pursuing the
economic interests of the entity. MLS's policy of contracting
centrally for player services is unilateral activity of a single firm.
Since § 1 does not apply to unilateral activity-even unilateral
activity that tends to restrain trade-the claim set forth in Count
I cannot succeed as a matter of law. 83
Thus, the district court granted MLS summary judgment on the players'
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 137-38. Several scholars have expressed concern over the court's failure to consider
the players' "sham" argument. They argue that the limited-liability shield should not be allowed
when the business has been structured to avoid a clear legislative purpose, in this case the Sherman
Antitrust Act. See, e.g., Michael P. Waxman, Fraser v. MLS, L.L.C.: Is There a Sham Exception to
the Copperweld Single Entity Immunity?, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 487 (2001).
80. Fraser 1, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 138.





MLS'S DESIGNATED PLA YER RULE
§ 1 claim, upholding the league's single-entity defense. 84 The court did not
discuss the players' § 2 monopolization and attempted monopolization claims,
which were decided in a jury trial commencing in September 2000.85 The
court eventually dismissed the players' § 2 claims after a jury found that the
players had failed to limit the market to division one professional soccer
players in the United States. 86 In fact, the jury found the relevant product
market to be all professional soccer players, not just division one, and the
geographic market to be worldwide rather than just the United States. 87 The
players subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit. 88
ii. First Circuit Fraser Analysis
The First Circuit began its analysis by noting that in characterizing MLS
as a single-entity, the district court parted somewhat with previous circuit
precedent, when the First Circuit denied the defense to the NFL in Sullivan.89
The court also "disagree[d] completely" with the players' "sham"
characterization of MLS's limited-liability structure, but refused to discuss the
merits of MLS's single-entity defense, instead focusing on the jury's
determination that the players had not proved a relevant market. 90
Although the First Circuit refused to answer the single-entity question
definitively, it did express concern that the league may not be a true single-
entity with a "complete unity of interests," highlighting several functional
differences that distinguish it from the structure in Copperweld.91  Such
differences include MLS operator-investors' various out-of-pocket expenses,
local revenues, and limited sale rights in their teams.92 The court also noted
the important fact that the operator-investors were not "mere servants" of
MLS, but actually controlled it through its managing board.93 According to
the court, MLS "has two roles: one as an entrepreneur with its own assets and
revenues; the other (arguably) as a nominally vertical device for producing
horizontal coordination, i.e., limiting competition among
84. Id. at 142.
85. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser II), 284 F.3d 47, 55 (lst Cir. 2002).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 59.
88. Id. at 55.
89. Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
90. Fraser II, 284 F.3d at 56.
91. Id. at 56-57.
92. Id. at 57.
93. Id.
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operator/investors." 94
Consequently, the First Circuit characterized MLS's structure as a sort of
"hybrid arrangement" somewhere between a single-entity and a collaboration
of existing independent competitors. 95 It noted the difficulty in applying
single-entity analysis to such hybrid arrangements, that the case for expanding
Copperweld was debatable, and that the case for labeling MLS as a single-
entity was even more so. 96 Even though the court expressed doubt as to
MLS's single-entity defense, it did not decide the single-entity question
definitively, as it instead focused on the asserted relevant market.97 Under the
rule of reason, the players had to show "that MLS exercised significant market
power in a properly defined market, that the practices in question adversely
affected competition in that market and that on balance the adverse effects on
competition outweighed the competitive benefits." 98 Because market power
analysis is the same in both § I and § 2 analysis, and the district court jury trial
decided that the players' § 2 claim must fail because they failed to show that
MLS had power in any relevant market, the First Circuit concluded that the
players could not prove market power in their § 1 claim as well. 99 Thus, the
First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision regarding the players' § 1
claim as well as their § 2 claim using market power analysis, avoiding the
difficult single-entity analysis.
IV. CURRENT MAKEUP OF MLS, THE BECKHAM RULE, AND ITS FUTURE
IMPLICATIONS
Since the First Circuit's decision in 2002, MLS has gone through a
number of changes. In an organizational sense, it still retains its limited-
liability company classification, but now operator-investors control all
fourteen MLS clubs, and the league itself controls zero.100 Additionally, MLS
94. Id.
95. Id. at 58.
96. Id. at 59.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 60-61.
100. Major League Soccer, About MLS, MLSNET.COM, http://www.mlsnet.com/about (last
visited Feb. 25, 2008). MLS itself no longer solely operates any of its clubs. The fourteen clubs are
operated by: Phil Anschutz & the Anschutz Entertainment Group (Houston Dynamo, Los Angeles
Galaxy); Andrew Hauptman (Chicago Fire); The Hunt Family (FC Dallas, Columbus Crew); Red
Bull Company (New York Red Bulls); The Kraft Family (New England Revolution); Kroenke Sports
Enterprises (Colorado Rapids); Dave Checketts & Sports Capital Partners (Real Salt Lake); Jorge
Vergara & Antonio Cue (Club Deportivo Chivas USA); Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment (Toronto
FC); OnGoal, LLC (Kansas City Wizards); D.C. United Holdings (D.C. United); Lew Wolff & John
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has made it a priority to build soccer-specific stadiums for its clubs, as eight of
the thirteen will play in their own stadiums by 2008.101 Also, in terms of
broadcasting, 2007 marks the first season in which every MLS game will be
broadcast on either national or regional television, as well as the first time that
MLS will not have to pay to have any of its games broadcast. 10 2 Recently,
MLS has witnessed lucrative franchise operation rights sales, including the
March 2006 sale of the New York/New Jersey MetroStars (previously owned
by Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG)) to Austrian energy drink company
Red Bull for a reported $100 million, a price that included the team and its
new stadium's naming rights. 10 3 Most recently in January 2007, D.C. United
Holdings, L.L.C. purchased the operating rights to the D.C. United from AEG
for $33 million. 104
These recent developments indicate a promising trend for MLS in terms of
financial stability and viability, as more investors are getting involved and the
league is garnering more and more media attention. In fact, MLS
commissioner Don Garber has indicated that he expects all league clubs to be
profitable by 2010.105 However, perhaps none of these developments will
have as drastic an effect on the face of MLS as its new Designated Player
Rule.
A. Designated Player Rule
Major League Soccer announced its Designated Player Rule in November
2006.106 The rule allows MLS clubs to exceed the salary cap (roughly $2
million per team in 2006) in order to pursue high-profile players. 10 7
Previously, the collective group of MLS investors paid all player salaries,
Fisher (San Jose Earthquakes). Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. MLS has reached long-term national television contracts with ABC, ESPN, Univision,
HDNet, Fox Soccer Channel, and Fox Sports en Espafiol, reportedly for a combined $20 million. Ben
Grossman, Soccer League Inks Deal Worth $15 Million, July 31, 2006,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA635748 l.html.
103. Jack Bell, Red Bull Is New Owner, and Name, of MetroStars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at
D4; see also Jane Havsy, MetroStars Sold to Red Bull, USATODAY.COM, Mar. 8, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/soccer/mls/ metros/2006-03-08-metrostars-redbullx.htm.
104. Robert Wagman, D.C. United Becomes First Minority-Owned Franchise in League,
SOCCERTIMES.COM, Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.soccertimes.com/mls/2007/jan08.htm.
105. Tim Lemke, MLS: Franchises to Profit by 2010, WASH. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at C7.
106. Major League Soccer Communications, MLS Implements Designated Player Rule and
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including those that exceeded $400,000.108 Under the new rule, the league
will pay only $400,000 of the designated player's salary, with the club to pick
up the remainder. 10 9 Although there is no cap on the total amount that a club
can pay its designated player, only $400,000 will count against its cap
figure." I 0 Each team will be allotted one designated player slot, which can be
traded among the teams, but no team is allowed to acquire more than two
designated players."'I The rule will be in effect for three years through 2009
when its future will be reviewed.11 2 In addition to the Designated Player Rule,
MLS simultaneously instituted an initiative to increase the clubs' shares of
transfer revenues generated from player transfers to clubs in other leagues-
allocating more money to the operator-investors-so long as they commit to
reinvest all of such revenue into a replacement player or players. 113
Upon its inception, the Designated Player Rule was nicknamed the
"Beckham Rule" as many speculated it was implemented in order to lure
English worldwide superstar David Beckham to MLS."14 Indeed, the league
announced in January 2007 that it had signed Beckham to become a member
of the Los Angeles Galaxy for $250 million over five years. 115 This landmark
signing launched the once-fledgling MLS into the global spotlight, opening up
108. Id. When the rule was announced, several players including Landon Donovan, Freddy Adu,
Carlos Ruiz, and Eddie Johnson had salaries that exceeded the $400,000 figure. These players will be
grandfathered for one year, after which they will need to renegotiate their contracts or assume
Designated Player status. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11. Id. In fact, less than three weeks after the announcement of the Designated Player Rule, the
large-market New York Red Bulls traded Amado Guevera to Chivas USA for Chivas' Designated
Player slot, giving the Red Bulls two Designated Player slots. Red Bulls Trade Guevara to Chivas
USA, ESPNSOCCERNET.COM, Nov. 27, 2006, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id =
393951 &cc=590 1.
112. Major League Soccer Communications, supra note 106.
113. Id. A transfer takes place when one club sells the contract of one of its players to another
club, usually for monetary compensation. Currently MLS permits outgoing transfers to non-league
clubs but does not permit intra-league transfers. Major League Soccer, 2007 MLS Player Rules &
Regulations, MLSNET.CoM, http://www.mlsnet.com/about/league.jsp?section-regulations&content
=overview.
114. MLS Approves "Beckham Rule " to Allow Star-Player Acquisition, USATODAY.COM, Nov.
11, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/soccer/mls/2006-1 1-11 -beckham-rulex.htm.
115. AEG, Global Icon David Beckham Signs with the Los Angeles Galaxy in Landmark Deal,
MLSNET.coM, Jan. 11, 2007, http://web.mlsnet.com/news/mls-news.jsp?ymd=2007011 l&content
_id=81598&vkey=pr.mls&fext.jsp. However, it has been reported that only $27.5 million ($5.5
million/year) actually accounts for Beckham's base salary. The remainder likely consists of
marketing and sponsorship agreements. Beckham 's Playing Contract Worth About $27.5 Million
over Five Seasons, USATODAY.COM, Feb. 24, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
soccer/mls/2007-02-24-beckham-salaryx.htm.
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speculation that the league would attract other international superstars such as
Portugal's Luis Figo or Brazil's Ronaldo.11 6  Commissioner Garber
commented on the signing: "David Beckham coming to MLS might be viewed
by some as one of the most important moments for soccer in this country and
perhaps the history of professional sport." 117 Although perhaps slightly
overstated, the Commissioner was not alone in his excitement over the
Beckham signing, as the news garnered headlines around the United States
and the world. 118 The Designated Player Rule and the subsequent signing of
Beckham surely have changed the face of MLS in the eyes of the global
public, but they may also have changed the league's characterization in the
eyes of the law.
B. The Designated Player Rule's Implications for MLS Antitrust Analysis
In its short lifetime, the Beckham Rule has had a tremendous impact on
the league, as it has brought to the MLS one of the world's most recognized
athletes as well as the global publicity that came along with him. However,
the rule may also change the way the courts view the league, particularly in
terms of antitrust. The single-entity defense continues to be an attractive, if
not particularly viable, defense for professional sports leagues. However,
when courts decide single-entity cases in the sports context, they usually find
that professional sports leagues are a group of separate entities with divergent
economic interests rather than single-entities. Even so, the First Circuit in
Fraser hinted that some sort of hybrid approach is more appropriate.
Regardless, the controlling factor that ultimately decided the MLS players'
demise in the First Circuit's Fraser decision was their failure to prove a
relevant market. Major League Soccer's Designated Player Rule could have
some impact on all of these aspects.
i. Single-Entity Analysis
Although the First Circuit expressed doubt as to whether MLS should be
characterized as a single entity for antitrust purposes, because it did not
expressly deny the defense, the league still has an interest in protecting its
116. Fihp Bondy, Adding Beckham Is Great Score for MLS, MSNBC.com, Jan. 12, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16581048.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Tom Timmermann, A New Galaxy: $250 Million Contract, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 2007, at DI; Matt Scott, History-Maker Beckham Reveals American Dream: MLS
Ready to Launch Massive Advertising Push, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 13, 2007, at 3.
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single-entity status. 119 However, MLS's various innovations since the First
Circuit Fraser decision, most notably the implementation of the Beckham
Rule, may make asserting the single-entity defense much more difficult.
When the district court upheld MLS's single-entity defense, it used a
formalistic approach, reasoning that the league's limited-liability structure
likened it to a corporation and therefore its members (shareholders) were
incapable of colluding. 120 The district court found crucial the fact that MLS
contracted directly with the players, and downplayed the fact that its operator-
investors did not absolutely share all costs and revenues. 121 Conversely, the
First Circuit, using a more functional approach, found that although the
operator-investors were technically shareholders, in practical effect the various
costs and revenues that were not shared by all the clubs led the court to doubt
they held a "complete unity of interests." 122
The Beckham Rule works against the district court's analysis and fuels the
First Circuit's doubt that MLS is a pure single entity. Because under the rule
the league will pay only $400,000 of the designated player's salary, the
individual operator-investors will have even more independent expenses, and
the league will no longer pay all player contracts. 123 These increased player
costs, even though they can at most apply to two players per team, will likely
dwarf the clubs' previous independent costs of management and coaching
personnel. The "unity of interests" diminishes as the designated player
contracts rise.
In addition to the Beckham Rule, the new innovation that allows operator-
investors to retain a larger portion of player transfer revenue when their
players leave for a foreign club could reduce the "unity of interests" in a
similar way. In order to receive the larger share of transfer revenues, the
operator-investors must agree to reinvest such revenues into player
acquisitions. 124 Although the transfer revenues do not go directly into the
operator-investors' pockets, the scheme creates possible divergent interests
that could give some clubs more player acquisition funds (which may be
applied to a designated player) than others if they were to sell a player to a
foreign club.
119. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser I1), 284 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2002).
120. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser ), 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000).
121. See id.
122. Fraser II, 284 F.3d at 56-57.
123. Indeed, David Beckham's reported $5.5 million per year salary is more than double the
salary cap for the other teams, especially those such as Chivas USA, who has already traded away its
designated player slot. Red Bulls Trade Guevara to Chivas USA, supra note 111.
124. Major League Soccer Communications, supra note 106.
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If there was any doubt as to MLS's single-entity status after the First
Circuit's Fraser decision, it was likely eliminated after the league's
implementation of the Designated Player Rule and the rationing of transfer
fees. Consequently, it will probably be much more difficult for the MLS to be
successful in asserting itself as a pure single-entity in the future.
ii. Hybrid Analysis
Although MLS may no longer be able to claim that it is a pure single
entity for Sherman Act § 1 purposes, the First Circuit hinted that especially in
sports, perhaps some sort of hybrid analysis is more appropriate.12 5 However,
it also noted the difficulty in applying such a standard. 126
If a court were to apply a hybrid standard, MLS would still have an
incentive to maintain its current structure to stay nearer to the single-entity
scheme than the collaborating competitor scheme. Both the district court and
the First Circuit acknowledged the inherent differences between MLS and
other U.S. professional sports leagues, such as its limited-liability structure,
the central contracting of player salaries, and its shared profits and losses. 127
Another important distinction made by the district court (in comparing MLS to
the NFL) is that the NFL "is fundamentally different from MLS. The NFL is a
confederation fused from agreements among preexisting, independently
owned teams; unlike MLS, NFL football clubs do not exist as part of an
overarching corporate structure." 128 As the court noted, unlike teams in other
professional sports leagues, MLS clubs did not exist prior to the forming of the
league, and their operator-investors have not and could not secede in order to
join or form a rival soccer league.
If a court were to apply a hybrid analysis to sports leagues when deciding
a single-entity defense, even with the Beckham Rule, MLS is more akin to a
true single-entity than the other U.S. professional sports leagues. It still shares
most of its revenues, the league still contracts directly with the vast majority of
its players, and its operator-investors are still tied to one another
(organizationally and financially) unlike any other league. The First Circuit's
hint that some sort of hybrid analysis in single-entity cases might be proper
provides the league with an incentive to retain these favorable distinctions.
125. Fraser 11, 284 F.3d at 58.
126. Id.
127. Id.; Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser 1), 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132-33 (D. Mass.
2000).
128. Fraserl 97 F. Supp. 2dat 138 n.10.
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iii. Relevant Market Analysis
The most important aspect to the First Circuit's appellate decision was the
district court jury finding that the players failed to prove any relevant
geographic and product market. Because the jury found the proper geographic
market to be worldwide and the proper product market to be all professional
soccer players, it determined that MLS did not have market power in any
relevant market. 129 This allowed the First Circuit to avoid the single-entity
question, because if MLS did not have market power, it could not
unreasonably restrain trade, monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. 130 Unlike
Major League Baseball (MLB), the NBA, and the NFL, which all have market
power as the premier top-flight league in their respective sports worldwide,
MLS faces competition from several more prestigious premier soccer leagues
throughout Europe, South America, and the world.
It is unlikely that MLS will join its American professional sports league
brethren as the worldwide premiere league for its sport in the near future.
However, the Beckham Rule could pave the way for such a development.
Although foreign leagues are well-established and have thrived for a
substantial amount of time, the lure of American endorsements and increased
marketability may lure other superstar players to follow Beckham to the
U.S. 13 1 MLS's current television deals cannot compare to those of other U.S.
sports leagues or premier European soccer leagues, and consequently cannot
support the astronomical salaries those leagues currently provide. 132
However, if MLS's popularity explodes in the way Commissioner Garber
dreams, MLS as a premier league may not be such a fanciful idea. Although
the relevant geographic market for antitrust purposes will likely remain
worldwide and MLS surely does not currently enjoy market power over
professional soccer players in the worldwide market, if the Beckham Rule has
its intended effect, MLS could become the premier soccer league in the world
and subsequently attain such market power.
129. Fraser I, 284 F.3d at 55.
130. Id. at 59.
131. David Owen, Brand Beckham Kicks off Soccer's American Appeal, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 20, 2007, at 10.
132. American broadcast giants CBS and FOX currently pay the NFL more than $1.3 billion per
year collectively to broadcast the league's games, while British broadcaster BSkyB paid more than
$442 million per year for the exclusive right to broadcast live English Premier League games from
2003-07. To contrast, MLS's 2007 television deal stands to net the league around $18 million. See
Late Season Games Can Be Moved to Monday Nights, ESPN.COM, Nov. 9, 2004,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1918761; Q&A: Premier League TV Rights,
BBCNEwS.coM, Apr. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.ud2/hi/business/4949998.stm; Major League
Soccer, supra note 100.
[Vol. 18:2
MLS'S DESIGNA TED PLA YER RULE
V. CONCLUSION
Major League Soccer's limited-liability company structure and various
organizational features allowed it to win summary judgment in its single-entity
defense in the district court's hearing of Fraser. However, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on
grounds of relevant market, refusing to answer the single-entity question
definitively. The players argued, and some scholars have agreed, that MLS's
single-entity structure as a limited liability company is simply a "sham"
designed to circumvent antitrust law, and even the First Circuit expressed
doubt as to whether MLS should properly be deemed a single-entity or
whether some sort of hybrid definition is more applicable. 133 Regardless, no
court has expressly overruled the district court's finding that MLS is a single-
entity. Consequently, for various reasons, where other professional sports
leagues failed in single-entity defenses, MLS succeeded.
The Designated Player Rule may work against this single-entity
characterization. Features such as league-funded player contracts as well as its
corporation-like profit sharing scheme distinguished MLS from other
professional sports leagues in the district court's Fraser holding. Although the
First Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for MLS without
expressly deciding its single-entity defense, the league still has an interest in
maintaining the defense as a viable option. A successful single-entity defense
blocks a § 1 claim under the Sherman Act without even analyzing market
power, pro-competitive effects, and less-restrictive alternatives under the rule
of reason. The new rule allowing investor-operators to pay a designated
player from their own funds may provide a significant shift away from a
"unity of interests" and into a more individualistic realm. Viewed in
conjunction with the First Circuit's prior doubt as to MLS's single-entity
status, the Beckham Rule may be the final straw.
Although MLS may no longer be a pure single entity, if courts were to
apply a hybrid analysis, the league is likely still much closer to a "unity of
interests" than other U.S. professional sports leagues, and may be treated
accordingly in the eyes of the law. Therefore, it still maintains an interest in
keeping its limited liability form.
In addition to single-entity implications, the Designated Player Rule may
have implications relating to the market for major professional soccer talent,
which was the focus in the First Circuit's Fraser decision. Although MLS
does not currently have power in the international market for division one
133. See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 79; see also Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser
I/), 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).
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soccer talent, the Beckham Rule could spur a transformation that may launch
the league into global powerhouse status.
The Designated Player Rule is an important step in the growth and
development of Major League Soccer. It will likely change the landscape of
the sport in America, hopefully for the better. With newfound publicity and
respect across the globe, the league can move forward and establish itself as a
premier soccer organization. However, such changes could also impact the
league's legal atmosphere, particularly regarding antitrust. If the league
wishes to compete with the other U.S. sports leagues, perhaps it will need to
accept the newfound legal difficulties that come with being a high-profile
economic player. Time will tell whether the league can attain true premier
status and what legal implications this power might bring.
Robert M. Bernhard
